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The principle of autonomy and international investment arbitration:  
Reflections on Opinion 1/17 
 
Eva Kassoti* and Jed Odermatt** 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Opinion 1/17,1 the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU or 
Court) found the design of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) 
in the Comprehensive Economic Agreement between Canada and the 
EU (CETA)2 was compatible with EU law. The Court found that the 
agreement did not undermine the autonomy of the EU legal order. One 
of the criticisms of the Opinion, and of the CJEU’s jurisprudence in this 
area, is that the Court oscillates between different conceptions of auton-
omy. Academic commentary has also highlighted the ambiguous and ill-
defined nature of the principle: ‘its scope has been somewhat nebulous, 
its limits ill-defined and its function intrinsically linked to furthering the 
powers of the Court of Justice’.3  We argue that Opinion 1/17 demon-
strates that the understanding of the principle of autonomy in a multi-
layered order such as the EU is to a certain extent fluid and context-spe-
cific. The concept has a minimum core, consisting of the requirement 
that ‘the essential character of the powers of the Community and its in-
stitutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered…’.4 Beyond this, 
 
* Senior Researcher in EU and International Law T.M.C. Asser Institute, Academic 
Co-ordinator of CLEER. 
** Lecturer in Law, City Law School, City, University of London.  
1 Opinion 1/17 EU:C:2019:341. 
2 ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the 
one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part’ OJ [2017] L 
11/23.  
3 P Koutrakos, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law and International Investment Arbitration’ 
(2019) 88 Nordic J Intl L 1, 49.  
4 Opinion 1/00 EU:C:2002:231 para 12.  
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the principle remains open to interpretation and application, particularly 
in cases in which the Court is called upon to judge the compatibility of 
particular international treaties with EU law.5 The inherent ambiguity of 
the concept is justified once gleaned through the lens of its function; au-
tonomy is by its very nature a relational concept. It affirms the separate 
existence of a system, rule or entity vis-à-vis another system, rule or en-
tity.6 From this vantage point, previous expansive readings of autonomy 
(discussed below) can be explained on the basis of the context in which 
they occurred. A reading of the relevant case-law, including Opinion 
1/17, through this contextual lens helps us make sense of the Court’s ‘os-
cillation’ between broad and narrow constructions of the principle in its 
practice.  
Zooming in on investment arbitration, in Opinion 1/17, the nature of 
the agreement, between the EU and a third country, allowed for a narrow 
construction of the principle of autonomy and a symbiotic relationship 
of international and EU law. By way of contrast, in Achmea,7 the agree-
ment applied in the relations between EU Member States (intra-EU BIT). 
The different nature of the relevant treaty and thus, the highly constitu-
tionalised setting within which the relations between the Member States 
took place, led the Court to apply a broad construction of autonomy.8  
Although the context-specific framing of autonomy put forward here is 
a helpful tool in making sense of the reasons underpinning the broad or 
narrow construction of autonomy in the Court’s case-law, context does 
not in and of itself dictate the Court’s response to each of these cases. 9   
 
5 The principle of autonomy also arises in other areas of EU law, such as deciding 
the effect of international law within the EU legal order. See J Odermatt, ‘The Principle 
of Autonomy: An Adolescent Disease of EU External Relations Law?’ in M Cremona 
(ed), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart 2018) 305. 
6 ‘Autonomy would seem to be, somewhat counter-intuitively perhaps, a 
nonautonomous, relational concept: one cannot be autonomous in isolation, or rather 
when in isolation the concept of autonomy does little work.’ J Klabbers, P Koutrakos, 
‘Introduction: An Anatomy of Autonomy’ (2019) 88 Nordic J Intl L 1, 4.  
7 Judgment in Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, Case C-284/16 EU:C:2018:158.  
8 ‘Autonomy is understood in broad and uncompromising terms, and compliance 
with it may not envisage any alternatives for safeguarding the essential features of the 
EU’s legal order’ Koutrakos (n 3) 56. 
9 See V Moreno-Lax, ‘The Axiological Emancipation of a (Non-) Principle: 
Autonomy, International Law and the EU Legal Order’ in I Govaere, S Garben (eds), 
The Interface Between EU and International Law: Contemporary Reflections (Hart 2019) 
71, where she notes that: ‘There is no a priori determinism of what autonomy entails’. 




As the Court’s development of the principle shows, autonomy is a 
gate to the outside world and to outside interaction with legal systems 
and rules. The Court itself is the gatekeeper. The principle of autonomy 
can be left open to allow interaction with the international legal order or 
it can be closed. That decision lies with the gatekeeper. As the Opinion 
of Advocate General Wathelet in Achmea10 shows, autonomy does not 
necessarily equate to isolationism (irrespective of the setting) and the EU 
legal order arguably has the necessary tools to absorb any frictions that 
may be caused from the interaction between international and EU law. 
In this sense, the way in which the Court has chosen to construe auton-
omy each time does not necessarily say much about the principle itself, 
but rather it says more about how the Court chooses to construe the EU’s 
relationship with the wider world. 
 
 
2.  Evolution of autonomy  
 
The CJEU’s jurisprudence on the autonomy of the EU legal order, 
particularly Opinion 1/17 and Achmea, demonstrate how the principle of 
autonomy is of importance, not just for the EU legal order, but also for 
international law more broadly. More particularly, the way that the Court 
frames autonomy is also relevant to the EU’s international partners – if 
other states wish to enter into agreements with the EU with dispute set-
tlement mechanisms, or if the EU seeks to join international organiza-
tions with dispute settlement bodies, these agreements must ensure that 
they do not risk undermining the autonomy of the EU legal order. This 
is not a condition arising from international law, but from EU law. Yet if 
autonomy is a malleable concept, and applied differently depending on 
context, then the CJEU’s jurisprudence on autonomy does not offer suit-
able guidance to the drafters of those agreements to ensure they satisfy 
autonomy requirements. Moreover, the reaction of many commentators 
to the Court’s autonomy jurisprudence, especially following Opinion 
2/13,11 demonstrates how the Court’s application of the autonomy prin-
ciple can give rise to surprising results. A common criticism is that the 
 
10 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, Case 
C-284/16 EU:C:2017:699. 
11 Opinion 2/13 EU:C:2014:2454. 
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principle of autonomy, as developed through the Court’s case-law, has 
become an overly ambiguous and malleable concept, which makes it dif-
ficult to predict whether a given agreement conforms with EU law. Such 
uncertainty and unpredictability can also be seen as the EU enters into 
agreements in the area of investment that contain dispute settlement 
chapters. 
The Court’s approach to the principle of autonomy may be under-
stood as fluctuating between narrow and broad conceptions autonomy. 
A ‘broad’ conception of autonomy is one that requires any envisaged 
agreement to ensure that there is no possibility, even hypothetically, of a 
body other than the CJEU, interpreting EU law. It also means that any 
arrangements that allow for dispute settlement must ensure the ‘specific 
characteristics’ of the EU legal order are preserved, but it also under-
stands that these specific characteristics include a broad and expanding 
range of concepts. A ‘narrow’ conception of autonomy, on the other 
hand, allows the EU to participate in dispute settlement bodies as long 
as sufficient ‘safeguards’ are put in place to protect the EU and its auton-
omy.12 This narrow conception of autonomy is mainly concerned with 
preserving the judicial monopoly of the CJEU. As discussed below, the 
Court’s approach – between a narrow or broad conception of autonomy 
– depends on how the Court conceives of the relationship between EU 
law and international law. 
There has been quite some debate about the conceptual origin and 
rationale for EU autonomy. In Opinion 1/17 the CJEU presented its un-
derstanding of the concept:   
 
‘…autonomy, which exists with respect both to the law of the Member 
States and to international law, stems from the essential characteristics 
of the European Union and its law. EU law is characterised by the fact 
that it stems from an independent source of law, namely the Treaties, by 
its primacy over the laws of the Member States, and by the direct effect 
of a whole series of provisions that are applicable to their nationals and 
to the Member States themselves. Those characteristics have given rise 
 
12 T Locke, ‘The Future of the European Union’s Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: Is It Still Possible and Is It Still 
Desirable?’ 11 (2015) Eur Constitutional L Rev 239, 243: ‘A narrow conception of 
autonomy, such as this, is appropriate as it serves the legitimate purpose of protecting the 
integrity of the EU law while retaining the EU’s capacity as an external actor’. 




to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdepend-
ent legal relations binding the European Union and its Member States 
reciprocally as well as binding its Member States to each other’.13 
 
The Court does not introduce anything new here. It asserts that au-
tonomy stems from the ‘essential characteristics’ of the EU and its law. A 
core part of this is that the EU and its law are not derived from any other 
source, from either international law or the law of the EU Member States 
– they have an independent existence. Understood this way, autonomy is 
not a relative concept at all, but absolute. An agreement cannot partly 
undermine the independent existence of the EU legal order. The Court’s 
understanding of autonomy as an absolute, binary legal concept, stands 
in contrast to academic commentary that often presents autonomy as a 
relational concept.14 Yet these are not as contradictory as may first ap-
pear. This is because, although the Court presents autonomy as in abso-
lute terms, the cases in which the Court deals with these issues involve 
the EU’s relationships and interactions with other legal orders – those of 
the EU Member States, or international law. As AG Bot mentions in his 
Opinion, ‘the preservation of the autonomy of the EU legal order is not 
a synonym for autarchy’,15 observing that the principle should not be un-
derstood as requiring EU isolationism. Yet understanding what the ‘es-
sential characteristics’ of the EU entails, and in what ways they may be 
undermined, does depend on the circumstances of each case, and the 
type of relationship that is envisaged. There may be some types of rela-
tionship, such as those with the legal order of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which the Court views as having greater potential for 
jeopardising the ‘essential characteristics’ of the EU legal order, and thus 
require greater scrutiny. Yet there may be instances where the relation-
ship, such as that with the CETA Tribunal in Opinion 1/17, involves 
fewer possibilities for those ‘essential characteristics’ to be threatened. 
Thus, while the Court understands autonomy in absolute terms, it has to 
 
13 Opinion 1/17 (n 1) para 109. Emphasis added.  
14 See B de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ 
(2010) 65 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 141, 142. J Odermatt, ‘When a Fence 
Becomes a Cage: The Principle of Autonomy in EU External Relations Law’ EUI 
Working Papers 2016/07, 1 ‘Autonomy, however, is not absolute. It does not so much 
describe an absolute quality of an entity, but the relationship of that entity with others, 
and in particular the ability of that entity to define this relationship’. 
15 Opinion 1/17, Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72 para 48.  
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consider how this principle is to be applied according to the type of rela-
tionship, and the broader overall context of that relationship. This is ex-
plained in more detail below in relation to Opinion 1/17 and Achmea. 
When understood as a relational concept, the Court’s oscillation be-
tween narrow and broad conceptions of autonomy, may appear more 
comprehensible. The obvious problem, however, is that such case-law 
may not give a useful guide to drafters when seeking to determine when 
an envisaged agreement will comply with EU law requirements. There is 
a tendency to understand autonomy as requiring an envisaged agreement 
to have certain ‘safeguards’. This means that certain institutional provi-
sions are included, for example, to ensure that the CJEU is given the au-
thoritative word on the interpretation of EU law. However, if the princi-
ple of autonomy is understood in a more relational fashion, the safe-
guards that are needed will depend on the type of relationship that is 
envisaged. The principle of autonomy should be understood as an over-
arching constitutional principle, one that is to be safeguarded in different 
ways, depending on the circumstances. Much of the criticism of the 
CJEU has been that it has been inconsistent in the application of the prin-
ciple. Yet such inconsistency is understandable, and perhaps even justi-
fied, if the issues that threaten the ‘essential characteristics’ of the EU 
legal order also differ from case to case. In this light, while it is acknowl-
edged that issues of predictability and legal certainty for international ac-
tors who wish to contract with the EU may still remain, the analysis pro-
vided here (hopefully) goes some way towards explaining the CJEU’s 
seemingly inconsistent rulings on the matter. 
 
 
3.  Opinion 1/17 – Reflections on autonomy and the future of ISDS 
 
 3.1.  Political context of the judgment 
 
As discussed above, the precise contours of the principle of auton-
omy largely remain nebulous and, thus, to a certain extent, context-spe-
cific. Statements to the effect that autonomy implies that ‘the essential 
character of the powers of the Community and its institutions as con-
ceived in the Treaty remain unaltered’16 support this proposition. Apart 
 
16 Opinion 1/00 (n 4) para 12. 




from a minimum core, which vaguely alludes to the preservation of the 
essential characteristics of the Union, the principle remains open-ended 
and is left to be clarified on a case-by-case basis. Against this background, 
this contribution zooms in on Opinion 1/17 and its wider implications.  
In order to understand what was at stake, it is important to note the 
politically charged context in which the request for an Opinion was 
made. The request reached the Court amidst considerable public disquiet 
about the role of ISDS mechanisms in international trade agreements. 
More particularly, concerns have been raised (which the EU has also 
shared) that current ISDS mechanisms are inappropriate for disputes in-
volving States due to lack of guarantees that arbitrators are independent, 
lack of consistency and foreseeability of awards, the high cost of the pro-
ceedings, as well as lack of transparency.17  In this light, the EU has made 
concrete efforts to reform the existing ISDS model. First, in the context 
of CETA, a new model for resolving disputes between foreign investors 
and States (and the EU) was introduced, namely the Investment Court 
System (ICS) model.18 Under this model, disputes arising under CETA 
will be heard by a permanent tribunal composed of independent and 
publicly appointed members (CETA tribunal) whose decisions are sub-
ject to an appellate body. It should be noted that the EU has also been 
promoting the establishment of a single multilateral investment court 
building on the ICS model in the context of the UNCITRAL. The CETA 
already contains a reference to the effect that: ‘[u]pon the establishment 
of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint Committee shall adopt 
a decision providing that investment disputes under this section will be 
decided pursuant to the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate 
transitional arrangements.’19  
However, not everyone was convinced. A number of civil society ac-
tors and academics have objected to the ICS mechanism included in 
CETA as they perceive it to be in tension with the autonomy of the EU 
 
17 SD Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 
1521. 
18 CETA, Chapter 8 section F.  
19 Art 8.29 CETA. 
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legal order.20 Concerns regarding the merits of CETA were also raised by 
Belgian regional parliaments – which led Belgium to ask for an Opinion 
by the Court regarding the compatibility of CETA with EU law pursuant 
to Art. 218(11) TFEU. In the meantime, the CJEU’s ruling in Achmea to 
the effect that ISDS provisions in intra EU-bilateral investment treaties 
(intra EU-BITs) are incompatible with the principle of autonomy of EU 
law21 led to widespread speculation about whether the Court would fol-
low a similar line of argumentation in relation to ISDS mechanisms pro-
vided for under investment treaties with non-EU countries. Would the 
Court also find that the ICS mechanism under CETA is incompatible 
with the principle of autonomy of EU law given its long-standing con-
cerns about protecting the autonomy of the EU legal order in its previous 
case-law?  
The political stakes were very high; a finding of CETA’s incompati-
bility with the principle of autonomy would have effectively signalled the 
death knell for the EU’s efforts of modernizing and promoting invest-
ment protection. As it is, the judgment removes significant hurdles for 
the ratification of CETA by Member States as well as the ratification of a 
number of other agreements containing similar ISDS provisions (such as 
the agreements with Singapore and Vietnam) and it significantly bolsters 
the EU negotiating position in the context of the ongoing UNCITRAL 
negotiations on ISDS reforms. Of course, it is not unusual for an Opinion 
procedure to involve a political dimension. Opinion 2/13, for example, 
took place in a context where the Court’s decision would have significant 
repercussions. At the same time, it needs to be highlighted that the legal 
and factual circumstances surrounding the present Opinion were sub-
stantially different. As it will be shown below, the ‘autonomy safeguards’ 
included in CETA imply that the increasingly high threshold of auton-
omy put forward by the Court in its case-law has not fallen on deaf ears. 
On the contrary, the inclusion of these safeguards attests to the political 
significance of the case. The extremely careful couching of the terms of 
the agreement means that its drafters took seriously into account the pre-
vious case-law of the Court on autonomy – and that they took great pains 
 
20 L Ankersmit, ‘Investment Court System in CETA to be Judged by the ECJ’ Eur 
Law Blog (31 October 2016) <http://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/10/31/ investment-
court-system-in-ceta-to-be-judged-by-the-ecj/>.  
21 Case C-284/16 (n 7) paras 59-60.  




to minimize the potential for jeopardising the ‘essential characteristics’ of 
the EU legal order.  
 
3.2.   The judgment 
 
The Court began its analysis of the compatibility of CETA’s ISDS 
provisions with EU law by recalling its settled case-law that an interna-
tional agreement providing for the establishment of an international 
court whose decisions are binding on the EU is, in principle, compatible 
with EU law provided that the autonomy of the EU legal order is re-
spected.22 The autonomy of the EU legal order is guaranteed by the judi-
cial system established under the Treaties, which provides for the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the CJEU to give the definitive interpretation of EU 
law – a feature which is further supported by the preliminary reference 
procedure envisaged under Art. 267 TFEU.23 The Court noted from the 
outset that the fact that CETA’s ICS stands outside the EU judicial sys-
tem does not mean, in and of itself, that it adversely affects the principle 
of autonomy.24 The reciprocal nature of international treaties and the 
need to maintain the powers of the EU in international relations entail 
that the EU may conclude an agreement creating an international court 
that is not subject to the interpretations of that agreement given by the 
domestic courts of any of the parties.25 The Court continued by stating 
that while EU law does not preclude, in principle, the creation of the 
CETA tribunal, the principle of autonomy dictates the examination of 
two points: a) that the CETA tribunal does not have the power to inter-
pret or apply EU rules other than the CETA provisions having regard to 
the rules and principles of international law applicable between the par-
ties; and b) that the CETA tribunal does not have the power to issue 
awards having the effect of preventing the EU institutions from operating 
in accordance with the EU constitutional framework. In other words, the 
Court examines whether these provisions ensure that the CETA tribunal 
does not have the power to influence EU law indirectly.26 
 
22 Opinion 1/17 (n 1) paras 106-107.  
23 ibid para 111.  
24 ibid para 115.  
25 ibid para 117. 
26 ibid paras 118-119. 
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Against this backdrop, the Court proceeded to examine the text of 
the CETA. As regards the first point, the Court highlighted that the ju-
risdiction of the CETA tribunal was confined to the interpretation and 
application of the relevant CETA provisions in accordance with the prin-
ciples and rules of international law applicable between the parties.27 It 
was also important that Art. 8.31.2 CETA expressly states that its bodies 
will not have jurisdiction ‘to determine the legality of a measure, alleged 
to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of a 
Party.’ These provisions guarantee that the Tribunal would not have the 
power to interpret or apply EU law.28 This guarantee is, according to the 
Court, what distinguishes CETA from other agreements that it had found 
problematic in the past (such as the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT in Ach-
mea).29  The Court further distinguished between CETA and intra-EU 
BITs by underscoring that the principle of mutual trust, which played a 
major role in its line of reasoning in Achmea, does not apply to agree-
ments between the EU and third states.30 In this context, the Court also 
examined certain other ‘autonomy safeguards’ included in Art. 8.31 
CETA and found them sufficient to guarantee the principle of autonomy 
of the EU legal order. These include provisions to the effect that in de-
termining whether a measure violates the agreement, the tribunal may 
only consider domestic law as a ‘matter of fact’ following the prevailing 
interpretation given by domestic courts and that domestic courts are not 
bound by the meaning given to their domestic law by the tribunal.31 
As regards the second aspect, the Court found that the awards issued 
by the CETA tribunal would not have the effect of preventing the EU 
institutions from operating in accordance with the EU constitutional 
framework. In particular, the Court addressed here the question of 
whether the creation of the CETA tribunal could have an adverse impact 
on the Union’s right to define the level of protection of public interests 
under EU law – especially in the context of examining a defence put for-
ward by the Union in response to a breach of the substantive protections 
 
27 ibid para 122. 
28 ibid paras 122, 133. 
29 ibid para 126.  
30 ibid paras 127-128. 
31 ibid paras 130-131. 




under CETA.32 The Court conceded that the principle of autonomy pre-
cluded the conclusion of an agreement:  
 
‘capable of having the consequence that the Union – or a Member State 
in the course of implementing EU law – has to amend or withdraw leg-
islation because of an assessment made by a tribunal standing outside 
the EU judicial system of the level of protection of a public interest es-
tablished, in accordance with the EU constitutional framework, by the 
EU institutions.’33 
 
However, the Court was satisfied that CETA provides sufficient safe-
guards in this respect. It contains various clauses expressly confirming 
that the CETA tribunal does not have jurisdiction to declare incompati-
ble with CETA the level of protection of a public interest established 
under EU law as well as guaranteeing the right to regulate in the public 
interest.34 
 
3.3.   Implications of the judgment 
 
The Opinion demonstrates how the application of the principle of 
autonomy is to a large extent fluid and context-specific. By way of con-
trast to previous autonomy case-law, both the Advocate General35 and 
the Court put great emphasis on ‘the reciprocal nature of international 
agreements’ as well as on ‘the need to maintain the powers of the Union 
in international relations’.36 This express reference to reciprocity illus-
trates the Court’s acknowledgement of the intense political overtones of 
the case; a finding to the effect that CETA were incompatible with the 
principle of autonomy would have been a rather bold move on the part 
of the Court undermining the efforts of the EU to modernize investment 
arbitration in the context of UNCITRAL.37 This is not the first time that 
the Court relied on an argument of ‘reciprocity’. In the context of deny-
ing the direct effect of the WTO Agreements, the Court also took into 
 
32 ibid paras 137, 149, 150. 
33 ibid para 150. 
34 ibid paras 130-131. 
35 Opinion of Advocate General Bot (n 15) paras 72-90. 
36 Opinion 1/17 (n 1) para 117.  
37 P Koutrakos, ‘More on Autonomy – Opinion 1/17 (CETA)’ (2019) 44 Eur L Rev 
293, 293.  
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account that the agreements were ‘based on the principle of negotiations 
undertaken on the basis of ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous ar-
rangements’.38 In that context, direct effect could cause a lack of reci-
procity vis-a-vis other WTO members and thus, it could entail the non-
uniform application of WTO law. However, it needs to be stressed that 
the situation at hand is different. That line of case-law concerned the ef-
fects of an international agreement within the EU legal order, whereas 
the present case concerned the compatibility of an external dispute set-
tlement mechanism with EU law.  
The Court carefully distinguished between the specific legal and pol-
icy context of the dispute and the one which led to the Achmea ruling. In 
Achmea, the Court found that the intra-EU context of the agreement was 
problematic to the extent that questions about EU law could arise before 
arbitral tribunals which themselves do not form part of the EU judicial 
system. Since they cannot ask the CJEU preliminary questions, this would 
have an adverse effect on the principle of mutual trust as well as on the 
preservation of the specific characteristics of the EU legal system and its 
autonomy.39 Advocate General Bot succinctly summarised the line of rea-
soning in Achmea by stating that the Court’s approach was: 
 
‘primarily guided by the idea that the judicial system of the European 
Union, in so far as it is based on mutual trust and sincere co-operation 
between member States, is inherently incompatible with the possibility 
of Member States establishing, in their bilateral relations, a parallel dis-
pute settlement mechanism which may concern the interpretation and 
application of EU law.’40 
 
The fact that CETA is an agreement between the EU (and its Member 
States) and Canada means that the concerns raised in relation to intra-
EU BITs are not applicable here. As the Court noted in its judgment, the 
principle of mutual trust is not applicable in the relationship between the 
EU and Canada, and thus, CETA cannot adversely affect the principle in 
question.41 Furthermore, the fact that the CETA tribunal, in contrast to 
the one in Achmea, can only take into account EU law as a matter of fact 
 
38 Judgment in Germany v Council, C-280/93 EU:C:1994:367 para 106. 
39 Case C-284/16 (n 7) paras 30-32, 34, 58.  
40 Opinion of Advocate General Bot (n 15) para 105.  
41 Opinion 1/17 (n 1) paras 128-129. 




means that the exclusive prerogative of the CJEU to provide binding in-
terpretations of EU law is not threatened, thereby minimizing concerns 
regarding the potential impact of the agreement on the principle of au-
tonomy.42 
Opinion 1/17 also confirms that although the context of a dispute is 
a helpful tool in making sense of the reasons underpinning the construc-
tion of autonomy in the Court’s case-law, context does not in and of itself 
dictate the Court’s response. As discussed above, autonomy is a gate to 
the outside world and to outside interaction with legal systems and rules. 
By way of contrast to a line of case-law where autonomy was couched in 
abstract and uncompromising terms – thereby employing autonomy as 
an instrument to highlight the separateness and primacy of EU law over 
international law, the point of departure in Opinion 1/17 is different. By 
emphasising the reciprocal nature of international agreements, the Court 
showed its willingness to envision a symbiotic relationship between 
CETA and EU law. The safeguards put in place can absorb any tension 
that may arise between the two legal regimes.  
The Court’s vision of the EU legal order’s relationship with interna-
tional law (antagonistic vs. symbiotic) lies at the heart of its (narrow or 
broad) construction of the principle of autonomy in different cases. This 
is further bolstered when one takes a closer look at the safeguards in place 
to secure the autonomy of EU law in Opinion 1/17. Here, the Court made 
sure to distinguish CETA from previous case-law: the CETA tribunal 
would not have jurisdiction to interpret and apply EU law (as opposed 
to Opinion 1/09); the tribunal would not be created on the basis of an 
agreement between Member States and thus, the principle of mutual 
trust would not be relevant (as opposed to Achmea); and the tribunal’s 
(incidental) interpretations of EU law would not be binding upon the EU 
and on Member States (as opposed to Opinion 1/91).  
There were issues that (arguably) required further scrutiny. In Opin-
ion 2/13 and in Achmea, even a hypothetical interference with the EU 
legal order was enough for the Court to find an incompatibility. In the 
context of CETA, this abstract possibility is not entirely eliminated. Even 
if the CETA Tribunal is bound to follow the CJEU’s interpretation of EU 
law, such an interpretation may simply not yet exist since investors can 
bring claims on the basis of recently enacted legislation which may have 
 
42 ibid para 131.  
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not yet been interpreted by domestic courts.43 Thus, there is still an ab-
stract possibility that the CETA tribunal may provide its own interpreta-
tion of EU law. Such an interpretation would not be binding at the EU 
law level, however, since the tribunal may consider domestic law only ‘as 
a matter of fact’ and the domestic courts are not bound by the meaning 
given to their domestic law by the tribunal. This differs from the situation 
in Opinion 2/13, whereby a decision of the ECHR would have been bind-
ing on the EU and the Member States. Although autonomy may mean 
different things in different contexts, this shows how much depends on 
the Court’s own construction of the relationship between EU and inter-
national law in a given case. In Opinion 1/17, the extra EU-BIT nature of 
the agreement helped steer the Court towards envisaging a symbiotic re-
lationship between international and EU law. Had the point of departure 
been different, the Court would likely have probed further, moving to-
wards a broad conception of autonomy.  
This point becomes even clearer if one takes into account the differ-
ent reasoning followed by the Court and AG Wathelet respectively in 
Achmea. In Achmea, the intra EU-BIT nature of the agreement arguably 
played a significant role in the Court’s ruling. At the same time, the 
Court’s finding was not a foregone conclusion. The Court in that case 
chose a broad and formalistic line of argumentation based on the auton-
omy of EU law – without embarking on a detailed examination of Art. 
344 TFEU to assess whether that Article allowed for investor-State arbi-
tration.44 In this sense, autonomy was seen in Achmea as a fence empha-
sising the separateness of the EU and the international legal order. How-
ever, the opinion of AG Wathelet in Achmea shows that there is an alter-
native way of reading autonomy – even in that particular context – 
namely as a bridge connecting the two legal orders. AG Wathelet argued 
in Achmea that arbitral tribunals established by intra EU-BITS meet all 
the necessary requirements in order to be considered as ‘courts’ or ‘tri-
bunals’ within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU and that since they are 
common to the two Member States they are bound by Art. 267 as far as 
the application and interpretation of EU law is concerned. Furthermore, 
 
43 M Gatti, ‘Opinion 1/17 in Light of Achmea: Chronicle of an Opinion Foretold?’ 
(2019) 4 Eur Papers 1, 9-10.  
44 S Gaspar-Szilagyi, ‘It Is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration: A Look at Case 
C-284/16 ACHMEA BV’ (2018) 3 Eur Papers 357, 365.  




according to the AG, the existence of these arbitral tribunals does not 
violate Art. 344 TFEU since they are required to respect principles of EU 
law, and failure to do so would result in the liability of Member States for 
damages and in enforcement actions by the Commission/other Member 
States. In this sense, the AG’s point of departure was that of a symbiotic 
relationship between EU law and investment law, and this allowed him 
to construct autonomy differently than the Court. Instead of formalism 
and distrust, the AG put forward the idea that international investment 
law and EU law can harmoniously co-exist, and that EU law contains 
enough safeguards (preliminary reference procedure, the principle of 
State liability) that its autonomous nature will not be eroded through in-
teraction with another legal order.  
The ruling is also of particular significance for the future develop-
ment of the principle of autonomy. By construing autonomy narrowly 
and by avoiding the ‘maximalist overtones’45 permeating Opinion 2/13 
and Achmea, the Court brought the concept closer to its conceptual ori-
gins (and thus more in line with its earlier case-law thereon). Opinion 
1/17 reflects the idea that autonomy is a mechanism for ensuring that the 
EU and its institutions are not bound by a particular interpretation of EU 
law stemming from a body that stands outside the EU judicial system. It 
is not merely a mechanism for ensuring the judicial monopoly of the 
CJEU.  
More broadly, the ruling has important consequences for the EU’s 
participation in international dispute settlement procedures – and, in 
general, for the EU’s role as a global actor. Both Opinion 2/13 and Ach-
mea were strong assertions of autonomy that cast doubt on the EU’s abil-
ity to participate in the wider international legal system. The narrow con-
struction of autonomy in Opinion 1/17 coupled with the fact that the 
Court accepted both in theory and in practice that EU law and interna-
tional law can co-exist harmoniously shows a considerable degree of 
openness towards international law. Ultimately, the judgment portrays 
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4.  Conclusion  
 
Although the Court is described as moving between narrow and 
broad conceptions of autonomy, it has never really departed from the 
original conceptual basis, that is, the separate and independent existence 
of the EU legal order. The oscillation between narrow and broader con-
ceptualisations of autonomy can be explained by the context and how 
the Court views the relationship between EU law and international law 
in each case. While Opinion 1/17 brought the principle of autonomy 
closer to its conceptual origins and to earlier case-law, the Court’s ap-
proach still stands in contrast to the broad conceptions adopted in Ach-
mea and Opinion 2/13. However, this also comes at the expense of legal 
certainty and clarity. Moreover, the EU will not always be in a position 
to include safeguard provisions as carefully drafted as those included in 
the CETA agreement. The Court’s application of the principle has 
broader significance for the EU’s relationship with international law. As 
the EU continues to become integrated in the international legal order, 
especially through its participation in international dispute settlement 
mechanisms, the Court’s jurisprudence on autonomy will continue to 
shape the nature of this relationship. Autonomy will continue to evolve 
and find new forms of application depending on the circumstances and 
political context.  
